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The Frasier Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World is often 
taken as a metric of market capitalism.  This paper argues that 
the index is an amalgam of measures capturing free markets 
and good governance, and analysts should remain cognizant of 
this conceptual conflation when using the index to develop 
policy prescriptions.  Implicitly, the “economic freedom” 
literature suggests that countries embrace an “Anglo-Swiss” 
policy model, although the rich world offers alternative models 
that maximize good governance but not liberalization.  Factor 
analyses suggest that the index’s Legal System & Property 
Rights component is more closely related to outside governance 
metrics that do not imply market liberalism than other 
“economic freedom” constituent measures.  
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The Frasier Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) (Gwartney and Lawson 
2008) is a well-cited annual assessment of countries’ “economic freedom.” Its index is generally 
accepted as a measure of market capitalism and is often used as an empirical basis for evaluating 
the effects of laissez faire policies.  I argue that this index is not strictly a measure of market 
capitalism, but rather an amalgam of at least two distinct, though related, concepts: economic 
liberalism and good governance.  The conflation of these two concepts presents problems for the 
practice of using the EFW to evaluate market capitalism’s effects. 
The paper begins with a review of the EFW and its reception in the scholastic literature.  
Analysts often accept the index’s nominal definition as a measure of free market capitalism.  
Four of the five sub-indices that generate countries overall “freedom” scores are very much in 
line with this project’s libertarian conception of “economic freedom”, but its Legal Structure & 
Property Rights component is argued to be distinct in both its content and empirical incidence.  
There are good reasons to see this fifth component as a different facet of a country’s economic 
environment, even if it is empirically coincident with laissez faire. 
I then discuss the EFW’s use as a set of guidelines that developing countries are 
implicitly advised to adopt if they wish to emulate rich countries.  While the rich world is both 
relatively liberal and well-governed, the advanced (post-) industrial economies exhibit different 
mixtures of both, and prescribing reforms that maximize both liberalism and governance is 
tantamount to recommending that countries embrace an Anglo-Swiss model of capitalism.  
Alternative models exist, and policy-makers have reason to entertain them. 
Through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, I show that the Legal 
Structure & Property Rights component is more closely related to outside measures of good 
governance that do not directly imply liberalization.  These findings suggest that the Legal 
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Structure & Property Rights sub-index does not measure market capitalism, but captures the 
good governance often found in advanced market economies. 
The maximization of good governance is not the same as maximizing economic 
liberalism, and analysts should keep these two policy initiatives conceptually separate.  A failure 
to distinguish them ignores important concerns about reform sequencing, obfuscates their 
individual contributions to economic welfare, and fails to consider the possibility that 
governance and liberalism can work at cross-purposes in countries’ pursuit of development.  
Analyses of the EFW should remain cognizant of the mixture of concepts implicit in its 
empirical specification of “economic freedom”, particularly when using the index to devise 
policy prescriptions. 
1. The EFW Index: Background, Composition & Reception 
The EFW is a regularly-published, well-cited index that measures countries’ level of 
“economic freedom”.  Its authors define such freedom as occurring where an economy is 
characterized by “personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and security of 
privately owned property” (Gwartney and Lawson 2008: xxi).  It is rooted in a libertarian 
conception of “economic freedom” often associated with Chicago School economics.  Analysts 
generally accept this frame.  I argue that its Legal Structure & Property Rights component is 
conceptually distinct from the EFW’s other constituent measures. 
1.1: Background 
The EFW locates its beginnings in the 1984 meetings of the Mont Pelerin Society 
(Walker 1996), an academic society whose members were strong advocates of the broad-based 
globalization, privatization and deregulation reforms that took place in the 1970s through early-
1990s (see Yergin and Stanislaw 1998; Harvey 2005).  A basic tenet of Mont Pelerin scholars’ 
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views was that the strongly interventionist policies adopted by governments after WWII (like 
Keynesianism or Import Substitution Industrialization) were counterproductive and undesirable 
(Yergin and Stanislaw 1998).  This focus on reducing government intervention is as a central 
policy concern, and the EFW’s focus on limited government is animated by this view. 
According to Walker (1996), the project was motivated by the notion that then-extant 
attempts to assess “freedom” empirically (e.g., Wright 1982; Gastil and Wright 1988) understood 
its economic dimensions to be too reliant on political processes, and failed to recognize “the right 
of people to pursue their economic activities free from arbitrary control and interference by the 
state and other individuals”, even if that state is democratic and its interferences a product of 
popular will (Rabushka 1991: 61).  In effect, the EFW was considered a redress to then-current 
discussions of economic freedom that, in the opinion of its contributors, over-emphasized 
democracy and the policy expressions of popular will.  An alternative, libertarian view of 
“freedom” was present in the EFW’s evolution, whereby its authors held that there exist 
“protective rights … that provide individuals with a shield against others who would invade 
and/or take what does not belong to them.” (Gwartney and Lawson 2003: 407).  Such freedoms, 
according to Gwartney and Lawson, are negative, and run contrary to “positive” freedoms that 
emphasize people’s rights to things like basic necessities (food or shelter), minimal income or 
essential services (like health care) (e.g., the conceptions of "freedom" offered by Sen 1999).  “If 
A has a positive right to housing, for example, this logically implies that A has the right to force 
B to provide them housing.  But in a negative rights context, A has no right to the labor of B or 
any other individual since B owns himself.” (Gwartney and Lawson 2003: 407).  This sentiment 
of negative freedoms being economic freedom is apparent in the index’s current formulation. 
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1.2: What is Meant by “Economic Freedom” Precisely?  
To see what is meant specifically by “economic freedom”, it is useful to see how the 
concept is measured.  Economic freedom scores represent the average of five sub-indices, each 
of which is intended to capture some constituent aspect of the overall concept.  The index has 
undergone many revisions since its introduction in 1996, and its current formulation is 
summarized below in Table 1: 
[Insert Table 1] 
Four of the five sub-indices rate countries as being “free” to the extent that governments 
limit their attempts to steer domestic activities, and accept whatever economic outcomes emerge 
from private activity.  The first three sub-indices’ suggestion of limited government intervention 
in the economy is reasonably straightforward: less government taxes and government-directed 
economic allocation, reduced government-imposed restrictions on international transacting, or 
less regulation all directly imply a government that is taking a more “hands-off” approach to 
economic management.  The Access to Sound Money component can also be understood as 
reflecting limited government in many senses as well.  Money supply growth is often understood 
as an implicit tax on money holders (e.g., Sumner 2004).  Easing restrictions on access to 
foreign-denominated bank accounts is a straightforward case of deregulation.  The sub-index’s 
use of low and invariant inflation as a marker of freedom could be debated, although the matter 
is bracketed here (also noted in Heckelman and Stroup 2000).
2
   
These sub-indices suggest a particular kind of freedom, whereby non-state actors’ 
decisions are not affected by government prerogatives.  It does not see decision-making 
                                                          
2
 Low (or at least controlled) inflation is often understood as a policy goal, like economic growth or low 
unemployment.  There are cases when inflation could conceivably be aggravated by liberal policy, for example in 
the case of internationally-transmitted inflation or currency pressures to trade- and external finance-dependent 
economies. 
 
6 
 
pressures stemming from non-state actors – like threatening dismissals to unionizing employees, 
business’ coordinated or collusive extrication of rents, or tying the provision of health care to 
employment – as eroding private, voluntaristic choice.  In fact, efforts to ease these sorts of 
decision-making pressures would likely hurt a country’s EFW freedom score, even if they were 
backed by popular political will.  Here, “economic freedom” is a function of maximizing non-
state actors’ discretionary power in the disposal of the assets they own. 
If these constituent measures of “freedom” are accepted as ideals that policy-makers are 
being specifically advised to embrace, then the index can be understood as providing 
commentary on the effectiveness of major pro-market reform initiatives of the late-20
th
 century.  
They bear great semblance to the tenets of the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990) (De 
Haan, Lundström et al. 2006), and involve reforms that were pushed by the 1989 Brady Plan 
(Edwards 1995), post-Soviet collapse “shock therapy” (Kolodko 2000; Aslund 2002) or early-
1990s IMF conditionality (Polak 1991).  As such, the EFW defines “economic freedom” along 
the same lines as the broad-based, late-20
th
 century movement that is often described as 
“neoliberalism” (Harvey 2005), or more blandly by its contemporary observers as “reform” 
(Edwards 1995; Rodrik 1996; Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). 
The fifth sub-index, the Legal Structure & Property Rights component, is often treated as 
constitutive of “economic freedom” on the grounds that it represents a structural condition 
required for markets to work well.  Below, I argue that this sub-index is conceptually distinct.  
However, most analyses do not strongly distinguish this sub-index from other EFW constituents. 
1.3: EFW Index in Policy Analysis 
The EFW frames its discussion of “freedom” in terms of unfettered private markets 
versus over-reaching interventionist governments, and those who analyze the EFW data appear 
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to accept this frame.  Scholars explicitly treat the EFW as a measure of “free markets” 
(Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006), a “market economy” (Berggren 2003), “liberalization” 
(De Haan, Lundström et al. 2006), “neoliberal” economies (Tures 2003) or some cognate 
concept that suggests laissez-faire capitalism.   
The EFW is widely used in scholastic analyses of the relationship between market 
capitalism and macroeconomic performance, in part because the data is more strongly rooted in 
transparent and objective (rather than more opaque and subjective) measures of liberalism 
relative to competing indexes of market capitalism (De Haan, Lundström et al. 2006).  The 
literature (reviewed in Berggren 2003; De Haan, Lundström et al. 2006) principally concentrates 
on the statistical relationship between EFW overall freedom scores and some metric of 
macroeconomic performance (like economic growth, poverty or longevity).  Much of it focuses 
on methodological concerns involved in assessing these relationships, for example on matters 
related to statistical controls (especially the use of sensitivity analysis), assessing Granger 
causality or instrumentation.  Where studies treat the validity of EFW as a measure of “freedom” 
in the sense of free markets or market capitalism, the index’s self-description is accepted at face 
value. 
Some studies have sought to decompose the EFW, recognizing the possibility that 
“freedom” does not represent a unitary theoretical construct.  Two strategies are often employed 
in such analyses: (1) the assessment of EFW constituent sub-indexes’ individual relationships 
with economic outcomes in isolation or net of each other or (2) the use of exploratory factor 
analysis to assess differences in the underlying constructs captured by these measures.   
Studies that have attempted to parse out the individual relationships between EFW 
constituent indexes and macroeconomic outcomes have focused on economic growth and 
8 
 
produced mixed results.  Ayal and Karras (1998) find Access to Sound Money measures to often 
predict growth rates reasonably well, and some evidence that free trade and small government 
measures could be important.  Carlsson and Lundström (2002) and Berggren and Jordahl (2005) 
suggest that the index’s Legal Structure & Property Rights and Access to Sound Money are 
strong predictors of growth.  Justesen (2008) argues that small government and deregulation are 
most important.   
Claudill, Zanella and Mixon (2000) attempt to disaggregate and reconstitute the EFW via 
exploratory factor analysis.  Their analyses result in a reconceptualization of the EFW as 
involving four factors – Free Enterprise, Stable Domestic Money, Government Size and 
International Monetary Freedom – a relatively model recasting of the index.  This analysis does 
not consider the potential for a serious governance component to the EFW because the Legal 
System and Property Rights sub-index had not yet been formulated when the study was 
conducted.  A similar factor analysis on current data would ultimately find results similar to 
those of Claudill and colleagues because that study was data-driven, restricted to the EFW data 
and without outside governance measures that do not necessarily imply liberalism.  As liberalism 
and governance are related empirically, factor analyses pick up on the reasonably strong 
correlation between the Legal Structure & Property Rights component and other EFW sub-
indices.  Outside governance measures can help clarify these questions because they expose the 
Legal Structure index to a test for discriminant validity (Campbell and Fiske 1959) – tests for a 
substantial difference between what it is supposed to measure (economic liberty) and outside 
measures intended to capture a different concept (good governance). 
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1.4: The Legal Structure & Property Rights Component 
The Legal Structure & Property Rights sub-index is somewhat distinct conceptually.  Its 
constituent measures are not concerned with limiting government intervention, but are included 
on the grounds that they constitute an essential “protective function” that provides “the 
foundation for both economic freedom and the efficient operation of markets” (Gwartney and 
Lawson 2008: 6).  These are not the negative freedoms that constitute the index’s purported 
underlying concept of freedom, but rather a “positive” freedom whereby governments provide 
essential services that secure people’s need for contract enforcement, order and conflict 
resolution.  Ultimately, they involve taxation, government appropriation and the exercise of 
government power, all of which suggest less private determination over economic outcomes.  Its 
inclusion of a criterion evaluating the absence of military influence in rule of law and politics is 
an explicit nod to the political freedoms captured by earlier studies of economic freedom from 
which the EFW attempted to differentiate itself. 
This sub-index can be understood as part of a broader policy initiative that need not 
imply more market capitalism.  Instead, it can be understood as part of an initiative that stresses 
“good governance”, reform packages that concentrate on making governments accountable, 
orderly, professional and non-corrupt (Burki and Perry 1998; Evans and Rauch 1999; Glaeser, 
LaPorta et al. 2004).  Governance and liberalism often coincide empirically, as the world’s 
wealthier countries are generally both better-governed and more liberal.  However, dramatic 
reforms in governance or liberalization need not involve commensurately dramatic reforms in the 
other, and the maximization of one does not imply the maximization of the other.  Indeed, there 
are reasons to believe that they are two distinct steps in a sequence, and many analysts have 
argued that good governance should be secured before going too far with liberalism.  If 
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governance and liberalism are not separated conceptually, these possibilities will not even be 
entertained. 
Early advocates of free market reform often saw illiberal markets as a cause of 
government corruption (e.g., Krueger 1974).  The basic idea was that governments’ intervention 
created opportunities for public officials to profit from clientelism and corruption, and that 
liberalization’s removal of these opportunities would ultimately decrease the severity of official 
malfeasance.  As such, free market capitalism was seen as a cause of better governance. 
There were at least two reasons to question this proposition.  First, the emerging East 
Asian economies, which were often held up as exemplars of market liberalization’s capacity to 
spur development, had governments that played relatively strong roles in steering their 
economies (Rodrik 1996; Bruton 1998).  The region’s strong export orientation notwithstanding, 
scholars argued that the key to the Asian Miracles laid not in hands-off governance but effective 
governance that would intervene in private affairs (Wade 1990; Evans 1995).  Comparative 
researchers showed that alternative forms of capitalism, some of which did not minimize state 
influence and power, existed across the advanced industrialized world, and could generate 
competitive industries and favorable macroeconomic outcomes (Hall and Soskice 2001).  The 
subsequent success of China, which has often maintained many vestiges of government 
intervention while experiencing phenomenal development, also lends credence to the notion that 
a strong but effective government can generate good macroeconomic performance. 
Second, many analysts argued that liberalization efforts often failed where governance 
was poor.  Stiglitz (2002), for example, cites the Soviet Union’s corrupt and incompetent 
transition government as a cause for the apparently poor payoffs of its rapid liberalization.  Latin 
America, where liberalization was embraced most wholeheartedly but whose governance 
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problems persisted, experienced lackluster economic performance over the past twenty years 
(Rodrik 1996; Cohen and Centeno 2006). 
Burki and Perry (1998) express a core sentiment underlying this view, that governance 
institutions – the “rules that shape the behavior of organizations and individuals of organizations 
and individuals” – were required to resolve what then seen to be key problems not addressed by 
globalization and “first-generation” Washington Consensus reforms:  edifying of quality public 
services that are essential to making private sectors competitive, containing of the volatility that 
appears to inhere in contemporary liberal financial markets, or addressing the inequality and 
economic vulnerability that can be exacerbated in liberal systems.  Whereas liberalization alone 
was once seen by many to be key to overcoming economic underdevelopment, concentrating too 
much on reducing government runs the risk of losing productive forms of government 
involvement in the economy.  Furthermore, if a strong government presence is required in 
particular areas for markets to work well, like contract enforcement and so on, does the 
introduction of market forces make sense in their absence?  Finally, even a limited government 
can do a lot to damage a development effort, and improving some facts of economic governance 
not related to limiting intervention [like better bureaucracies (Evans and Rauch 1999) or political 
stability (Alesina, Ozler et al. 1996)] could help explain countries economic fortunes. 
A key issue here is whether governance constitutes similar or different policy concerns 
from the advancement of market capitalism.  It is logically conceivable for a government to have 
a small and completely mismanaged government, or a large and well-run one.  Below, I offer 
empirical tests of this question, which show that, although liberalization and good governance 
are related, they constitute different concepts, and the EFW’s Legal System & Property Rights 
index pertains to the latter. 
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2. Methods 
The analysis sets forth two goals.  First, it attempts to show that the rich world, whose 
embrace of market capitalism serves as a basis for advising other countries to liberalize, does not 
maximize liberalism and good governance across the board.  While both good governance and 
free markets are present in healthy doses in wealthy countries, much of the OECD resists several 
forms of liberalization.  My attempt to classify these liberalization-governance variations is 
pursued through complete-linkage hierarchical cluster analysis, which works to differentiate 
groups by progressively agglomerating individual observations into groups by collecting them 
according to farthest Euclidian (L2) distances between groups (see Kaufman and Rousseeuw 
1990; Everitt, Landau et al. 2001; StataCorp 2007) .  In other words, it collects observations into 
groups by iteratively aggregating them to produce maximally-different groups in a 
multidimensional space (defined by the variables used in the cluster analysis). 
Second, I examine the degree to which economic liberalism and governance can be 
treated as two distinct concepts, and attempt to determine whether the EFW’s Legal Structure & 
Property Rights index bears a closer relationship to the former or latter.  Towards these ends, it 
employs exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.  Warner (2008: Ch. 18) provides an 
overview and comparison of these two factor-analytical methods.  In addition to not addressing 
the implications of governance factors (due to their then-absence in the EFW), Claudill, Zanella 
and Mixon’s (2000) use of exploratory factor analysis is a data-driven exercise, and vulnerable to 
Type I error (the analyst’s identification of factors that may not exist empirically).  Such 
analyses, according to Warner, are vulnerable to “over-interpretation” (p. 814), rooted in the 
analyst having mistaken exploratory factor analysis’ findings as real-world categories.  
Confirmatory factor analysis provides a somewhat stronger method for assessing measurement 
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models, which employs a priori data categorizations based on theory and tests the significance of 
these a priori grouping’s ability to predict relationships among variables.  In other words, 
confirmatory factor analysis exposes data groupings to the possibility of being rejected. 
I analyze the EFW’s publicly-released 2008 data, and concentrate on countries’ mean 
scores for 1995 to 2006.  Missing data from 1996 to 1999 were interpolated linearly before 
calculating these means. To assess whether the EFW is substantially discrepant from other 
governance measures that do not directly imply market capitalism, I include outside data from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi’s (2007) Governance Indicators (GI).  The GI is comprised of 
six composite indices designed to capture various aspects of “good governance.”  They are 
detailed in Table 2 below. 
[Insert Table 2] 
The GI Rule of Law and Control of Corruption indices were deemed a priori to have too 
much conceptual overlap with measured used to construct the EFW Legal System & Property 
Rights sub-index.  To avoid stacking the deck by including measures of similar underlying 
constructs, it was excluded from the factor analyses.  The decision is taken to be conservative, as 
both indices are highly correlated with the EFW Legal System sub-index and hence have a 
likelihood of pushing analytical results towards identifying the latter as a governance-related 
factor.  The GI Regulatory Quality component was deemed to provide a commentary on policy 
rather than governance, and specifically concentrates on the empowerment of the private sector.  
My intent is to distinguish strongly between policy (specifically, liberalism) and more strictly 
non-policy economic governance metrics. 
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3. National Models of Capitalism  
The EFW’s annual reports emphasize the fact that the world’s richest countries are also 
its most liberal ones.  This relationship is presented as a reason for encouraging developing 
countries to liberalize (Gwartney and Lawson 2008).  The basic idea underlying this prescription 
is that poor countries can become wealthy by emulating rich ones, a contestable proposition that 
has been criticized by many scholars (reviews in Chirot and Hall 1982; Hettne 1995; Easterly 
2001).  I bracket these concerns, and instead propose that the rich world offers a variety of 
national economic models that embrace liberal markets to varying degrees (see also Hall and 
Soskice 2001). 
Table 3 (below) presents the pairwise correlations between logged per capita GDP 
(drawn from the World Bank's 2008 World Development Indicators), the five EFW sub-indexes 
and the six GI governance indexes.  With the exception of the EFW’s Size of Government 
indicator, these indexes’ strong correlations with per capita GDP (>0.500) suggest that rich 
countries tend to be both liberal and well-governed. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The negative relationship between the Size of Government measure and other indicators 
could be the product of Wagner’s Law, a propensity for wealthier economies to have larger 
government budgets relative to GDP (see Peacock and Scott 2000).  For present purposes, this 
discrepancy is treated as non-problematic because the construct is thematically similar to the 
basic underlying concept of “freedom” as reduced government (i.e., face validity is strong). 
Smaller government can be treated as a form of limited government, even if the wealthy do not 
embrace it. 
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All of the other measured indicators have strong relationships.  Note that the GI 
governance indexes are highly correlated with each other, and with the EFW Legal System & 
Property Rights index.  Curiously, the GI’s relationship with other EFW indicators seems 
slightly stronger than the relationships among EFW indicators.  This observation is possibly a 
product of wealthy advanced economies being generally well-governed, but having a propensity 
to pick-and-choose their forms of liberalism. 
A variation in rich countries’ adoption of liberalism is suggested by cluster analyses.  
Figure 1 (below) presents a dendrogram describing the results of a cluster analysis that used 
average annual scores for EFW and GI indicators in 21 OECD countries.  The purpose of cluster 
analysis is to identify distinct groups of countries that show similar combinations of 
liberalization policies and governance characteristics within groups, but distinct combinations 
from other groups.  Countries linked by lower-order branches in this chart are deemed to be more 
similar in terms of their liberalism-governance profiles.   
[Insert Figure 1] 
The cluster analysis sorts these 21 OECD countries into five sizeable groups.  The first, 
which will be termed the “Anglo-Swiss” model, comprises all of the English-speaking OECD 
and Switzerland.  The second group (the “Continental” model), includes most of the Northern 
European Union members, although France and Sweden are demarked as a “Franco-Swedish” 
variant of the model.  Mediterranean European countries constitute a fourth group, and Japan is 
identified as a unique case.   
To discern the character of these groups, Table 4 (below) presents the median EFW and 
GI scores for 1995 – 2006. 
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[Insert Table 4] 
The Anglo-Swiss countries are the world’s “freest” countries, with overall EFW scores 
that are significantly higher
3
 than other regions depicted in the table.  These standout scores are 
not the product of sound money, freer trade or a stronger legal system, which are statistically 
indistinguishable from Continental economies.  Access to Sound Money is similar across all 
countries, although the Mediterranean barely misses the Pr=0.05 threshold.  The defining 
characteristic of these economies is their relatively small governments and strong embrace of 
deregulation, both of which are significantly higher than in other regions.   
The Continental model of capitalism offers an alternative to the Anglo-Swiss model.  As 
a group, they are significantly less liberal, but marginally better-governed (though not 
significantly so).  Whereas the Anglo-Swiss countries simultaneously secure good governance 
and liberalism, the Continental models eschew government reduction and deregulation while 
maximizing good governance.  The Franco-Swiss variant of the Continental model’s defining 
characteristic appears to be very large governments, but they are otherwise similar to Continental 
countries. 
The Mediterranean OECD and Japan is more weakly governed and less liberal.  Japan is 
generally better-governed and less open to trade, while the converse is true for the 
Mediterranean. 
Thus, when policy-makers are advised to embrace “economic freedom”, they are 
implicitly being asked to follow an Anglo-Swiss economic model.  Presumably, embracing this 
model pays off in clearer gains in economic welfare.  Exploring such relationships lies outside of 
                                                          
3
 According to pairwise t-tests for differences in group means.  Here, “significant” differences are those whose t-
tests suggest a probability of greater than 95% that group means are different. 
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the concerns of this paper.  In all likelihood, there are different benefits involved in pursuing the 
Anglo-Swiss strategy versus the Continental models – maximizing liberalism and governance 
versus maximizing governance but setting limits to markets’ reach.  The point being made here is 
that, if we do not differentiate liberalism from good governance, we cannot explore these 
differences.  We end up lumping all of the rich world’s policy strategies into a common category 
called “freedom”.  These comparisons suggest that a choice ultimately presents itself to policy-
makers: whether to go “all the way” with liberalism or seek to limit it once it reaches some 
minimal level.  The developing world need not hold up the English-speaking OECD as the only 
model to pursue development.  Europe offers an alternative model that merits consideration. 
4. What Concept Does the Legal System & Property Rights Sub-Index 
Capture? 
Given the possibility that liberalism and governance represent distinct agenda, even if 
they are both found in good measure among the rich countries, the next question to be addressed 
concerns the EFW’s Legal System & Property Rights sub-index.  Does it represent good 
governance or free market capitalism?  One way to address this question is to ask whether high 
Legal System scores are more often found in liberal or well-governed countries.  This question 
can be addressed via factor analysis.  The analyses presented below find that a strong legal 
system and secure property rights are found in both liberal and well-governed countries, but that 
the measure seems more closely related to good governance. 
4.1: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The purpose of exploratory factor analysis is to reduce a larger set of variables into a 
smaller range of factors denoting common underlying concepts.  Table 5 summarizes the results 
of the exercise.  Each row represents a factor, a unique underlying concept that these indicators 
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collectively capture.  The first column lists each factor’s variance, is the variance accounted for 
by its corresponding factor.  The second column represents proportion of total variance captured 
by a given factor.  Column Three lists the cumulative count of the proportion of variance 
captured by these factors.  The figure exceeds 100% because unreported additional factors 
registered negative variance scores.  These models can over-fit data, and then compensate later 
with negative variance-scoring factors. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 6 gives the rotated factor loadings, which are transformed loadings that help 
establish clearer differences among factors: 
[Insert Table 6] 
The results can be interpreted as follows.  Two underlying factors can be construed as 
explaining the majority of variation found in the five EFW and three GI indicators measured 
here.  Factor 1 appears to correlate positively with both EFW and GI indicators, suggesting an 
amalgam of liberalization and good governance.  Conventional rules-of-thumb hold that a factor 
loading of 0.7 constitutes a strong relationship, although some argue that lower thresholds are 
acceptable (Raubenheimer 2004).  Factor One appears to be very strongly determined by 
governance variables (at a stringent cutoff of 0.8), including the EFW Legal System & Property 
Rights index.  However, other EFW measures are also strongly associated with this first factor, 
particularly its Freedom to Trade component.  I interpret this result as an indicator that signals 
general economic development, which depends very strongly on good governance and less so on 
the presence of liberalism.  In this case the EFW Legal System index behaves very much like a 
governance indicator. 
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A second factor, which explains roughly 17% of the variation present in the data, 
captures liberalism more strictly and exhibits little relationship with the Legal Structure & 
Property Rights index.  I take this factor to represent market capitalism separated from 
governance concerns.  It may be the economic libertarianism that lies at the core of policy 
thinking that motivates the larger “economic freedom” enterprise, and it does not involve the 
legal system or property rights. 
Such an analysis is exploratory and suggestive.  The fact that free trade also seems to be 
related to good governance (albeit much more weakly) makes the case for the Legal System 
indicator’s uniqueness still somewhat weak.  Confirmatory factor analysis enables us to directly 
test a priori specified categorizations of the data.  I turn to this method next. 
4.2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction of the model being tested.  Two latent concepts 
(denoted by circles) are theorized to be captured by the EFW and GI empirical measures 
(denoted by boxes): Liberalism and Governance.  The arrows from the latent to measured 
variables denote the relationship between observed measurements and their underlying, latent 
theoretical constructs.  The coefficient of these measures is denoted by lambdas (λ).  The dotted 
line from the Liberalism latent measure to the EFW Legal System & Property Rights index 
represents its use in one model, in which that measure is taken to be related to both Liberalism 
and Governance.  Each measured variable (in boxes) in the model has an error term that is not 
drawn in the model for the sake of legibility.  The curved line between Liberalism and 
Governance, labeled with phi (φ), measures a relationship between the Liberalism and 
Governance constructs. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
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Table 7 (below) shows the results of two models.  The first model considers the Legal 
System & Property Rights measure that signals both Liberalism and Governance.  The second 
takes that measure to capture Governance only. 
[Insert Table 7] 
Model One assesses both the Liberalism and Governance construct, and considers the 
EFW Legal System & Property Rights index to be a potential predictor of both.  Its model fit 
meets the standards set by Hu and Bentler (1999): an standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR) below 0.09 and Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of 0.96 or higher. 
Factor loadings for both the Liberalism and Governance latent variables are reasonably 
similar and significant, except for the Legal System measure, which registers an insignificant, 
negative coefficient for Liberalism.  I test the effects of removing the relationship between 
Liberalism and the Legal System & Property Rights indicator in Model Two.  Other factor 
loadings seem to be minimally affected.  SRMR and CFI statistics remain adequate.  The BIC fit 
statistic suggests a better model fit suggesting that a better fit for the data after adjusting for the 
number of parameters employed in the model.   
Both models suggest a strong relationship between Liberalism and Governance.  They 
can reasonably be construed as two facets of an overall “development” process.  However, the 
analysis makes it clear that this larger process involves two distinct components. 
5. Conclusion 
The EFW advocates policy-makers’ embrace of “economic freedom” on the grounds that 
it is a defining characteristic of the world’s richest countries, and marshals the support of an 
index measuring “freedom” in support of that proposition.  The notion that the world’s richest 
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countries are the “freest” is true, but some care should be taken when considering what 
“economic freedom” means in empirical, rather than nominal, terms.  Free markets, fair courts 
and a strong legal system are all present in these objects of emulation, but lumping these 
concepts together imparts the impression that they are all expressions of a single policy project.   
They are not.  “Economic freedom” is an amalgam of two distinct concepts: free markets 
and good governance.  Attempting to maximize both is not an act of emulating the entire rich 
world, but rather one that emulates primarily the English-speaking rich world.  By separating 
free markets from good governance, we can see that alternatives models of capitalism exist.  
Indeed, much of the European Union has secured world-class governance while embracing 
liberalization more haltingly. 
Of course, whether or not the Continental European model should be emulated is a matter 
of debate.  The net benefit of pursuing either of these models of capitalism, or other ones, is an 
empirical question.  The main point is that, if we do not distinguish free markets from good 
governance, such questions will not even be entertained.  Governance and liberalism may have 
different effects on different policy goals, and an exploration of these differences may provide 
very useful information that can shape countries’ policy priorities. 
Aside from the fact that the rich world offers distinct models of capitalism, there are other 
reasons to keep questions of free markets separate from those of good governance.  First, there 
are issues related to reform sequencing.  If a strong and fair legal system does represent a 
structure requirement necessary for markets to work well, does it make sense to liberalize an 
economy in their absence?  The “liberalization first” strategy was employed in both Latin 
America and the transitioning Soviet Union, and rendered disappointing results in many respects.  
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These policy failures may suggest that dangers lurk in treating governance and liberalism as part 
of a common policy package. 
Second, there are instances in which liberalism and good governance could work at cross-
purposes in the pursuit of macroeconomic goals.  There may be instances in which too much 
democracy, political stability or bureaucratic control could mitigate the benefits of market 
liberalization.  The EFW was originally rooted in the view that political liberalization could 
ultimately undermine development if it led to populist policies that destroy incentives to invest 
and produce.  Likewise, there are conceivable circumstances in which policy-makers may deem 
it important to pursue specific initiatives, even at the cost of sowing political discontent or 
overriding bureaucrats. 
Likewise, too much liberalism could hurt macroeconomic gains that accrue as a result of 
a well-managed government.  Unpopular liberalization policies can disrupt political order too 
much, or a penchant for overruling or neglecting a bureaucracy in the interests of short-term 
policy objectives may cause problems that hurt development over the long-term.  In addition, 
there are circumstances in which markets really need government oversight – the 2007 global 
financial crisis being an obvious potential example.  Where countries lack effective governments, 
they may be at the mercy of private (and often foreign) markets, which can lead to trouble when 
these markets’ interests diverge from those relative to general economic welfare. 
The data presented here suggest that – to the extent we can equate the rich world’s policy 
strategies with good policy for others – some measure of free markets and good governance is 
probably desirable, but these programs are not identical and should not be treated as such.  Those 
who engage the EFW should remain cognizant of the conceptual conflation that exists in its 
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strategies to measure “freedom”, and take care to parse these separate issues when using the 
EFW as a basis for making policy prescriptions. 
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Figure 1: Dendrogram of Cluster Analysis of EFW and GI Indices in OECD, 1995 - 2006 
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Figure 2: Diagram of Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model 
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Table 1: Constituent Sub-Indices of EFW 
Component Conditions that Enhance “Freedom” 
Size of Government 
Expenditures, Taxes 
and Enterprises 
Low government consumption, transfers, subsidies, investment 
and enterprise ownership, and low taxes. 
Freedom to Trade 
Internationally 
Low and invariant tariffs, low regulatory trade barriers, formal 
market-determined exchange rates, relatively large trade 
sectors, low capital market controls 
Regulation of Credit, 
Labor and Business 
Private banking, openness to international banking, private 
sector-directed credit, low interest rate controls, minimum 
wages, regulatory compliance costs, prevalence of centralized 
collective bargaining, price controls, need to pay bribes or 
military conscription. 
Access to Sound 
Money 
Low and invariable inflation, low growth in M1 money supply, 
no restrictions on foreign currency bank accounts 
Legal Structure & 
Security of Property 
Rights 
Independent judiciary, impartial courts, protection of property 
rights, no military interference in politics or courts, rule of law, 
legal enforcement of contracts, low regulation on real estate 
 Source:  Gwartney and Lawson (2008) 
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Table 2: Governance Indicators IV Indices: Nominal Definitions 
Indicator Definition 
Voice & Accountability Citizens’ ability to participate in selecting government, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and free 
media 
Political Stability & the 
Absence of Violence 
Likelihood that government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism 
Rule of Law Agents have confidence in and abide by rules of society, 
particularly in contract enforcement, property rights, 
police, courts and likelihood of crime and violence 
Control of Corruption Public power is not exercised for private gain, and state is 
not captured by elites or private interests 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Quality of public services, civil service and degree of 
independence from political pressures, quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and credibility of 
government commitment to such policies 
Regulatory Quality Ability of government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
        Source:  Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) 
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlations, EFW & GI Indicator Annual Means, 1995 - 2006, 148 Countries 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Per Capita GDP (log) 1.000 
           (2) EFW Govt. Size -0.141 1.000 
          (3) EFW Sound Money 0.577 0.169 1.000 
         (4) EFW Free Trade 0.745 0.009 0.608 1.000 
        (5) EFW Regulation 0.529 0.231 0.630 0.638 1.000 
       (6) EFW Legal Structure 0.778 -0.201 0.626 0.682 0.654 1.000 
      (7) GI Voice 0.686 -0.078 0.607 0.686 0.583 0.766 1.000 
     (8) GI Pol. Stability 0.703 -0.131 0.628 0.690 0.600 0.845 0.780 1.000 
    (9) GI Rule of Law 0.817 -0.160 0.691 0.725 0.649 0.943 0.849 0.862 1.000 
   (10) GI Contr. Corr. 0.791 -0.170 0.654 0.704 0.672 0.926 0.817 0.829 0.966 1.000 
  (11) GI Govt. Eff. 0.833 -0.154 0.680 0.754 0.671 0.929 0.859 0.841 0.968 0.966 1.000 
 (12) GI Reg. Quality 0.778 -0.037 0.705 0.825 0.688 0.862 0.896 0.810 0.915 0.890 0.932 1.000 
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Table 4: Mean EFW and GI Scores by OECD Clusters 
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Anglo-Swiss 8.14 6.57 9.56 7.98 7.71 8.86 1.43 1.11 1.94 
Continental 7.53 4.39 9.49 8.15 6.74 8.89 1.48 1.22 2.00 
Franco-Swedish Continental Variant 7.12 3.19 9.67 7.93 6.60 8.22 1.35 1.07 1.84 
Mediterranean 7.02 5.41 9.35 7.61 5.84 6.90 1.13 0.69 1.07 
Japan 7.26 5.67 9.64 6.41 6.68 7.90 0.93 1.12 1.28 
Total 7.58 5.26 9.51 7.89 6.88 8.39 1.36 1.06 1.75 
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Table 5: Factor Analysis of EFW and GI Variables, 128 Country Means, 1995 - 2006 
Factor Variance Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.716 0.8601 0.8601 
Factor2 0.939 0.1713 1.0314 
Factor3 0.102 0.0187 1.0501 
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Table 6: Rotated Factor Loadings for Factor Analysis in Table 5 
 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
EFW Size of Government -0.1999 0.5832 0.0417 0.6182 
EFW Sound Money 0.6384 0.4467 0.0603 0.3893 
EFW Free Trade 0.7383 0.2874 0.1130 0.3595 
EFW Regulation 0.6284 0.5305 0.1130 0.2154 
EFW Legal Structure 0.9528 0.0372 -0.0217 0.0752 
GI Voice & Accountability 0.8411 0.1271 0.2321 0.2226 
GI Political Stability  0.8827 0.0885 0.1181 0.1990 
GI Government Effectiveness  0.9664 0.1023 0.0182 0.0554 
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Table 7: Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Liberalism and Governance 
  Estimate Std Err. Z-Value Estimate Std Err Z-Value 
λ11 Freedom  Sound Money 0.764 0.073 10.526 0.763 0.073 10.517 
λ12 Freedom  Regulation 0.766 0.073 10.525 0.773 0.072 10.666 
λ12 Freedom  Free Trade 0.835 0.069 12.017 0.830 0.070 11.911 
λ14 Freedom  Legal System -0.189 0.138 -1.367    
λ21 Governance  Legal System 1.116 0.148 7.522 0.939 0.062 15.166 
λ22 Governance  Voice 0.863 0.066 13.121 0.865 0.066 13.180 
λ23 Governance  Pol. Stability 0.870 0.066 13.423 0.865 0.066 13.102 
λ24 Governance  Govt. Eff 0.982 0.060 16.447 0.986 0.059 16.589 
e1 Sound Money  0.417 0.058 7.158 0.417 0.058 7.132 
e2 Regulation 0.413 0.059 7.022 0.403 0.058 6.984 
e3 Free Trade 0.303 0.048 6.290 0.311 0.049 6.360 
e4 Legal System 0.104 0.020 5.146 0.117 0.017 6.924 
e5 Voice 0.255 0.032 7.992 0.252 0.031 8.050 
e6 Pol. Stability 0.243 0.033 7.448 0.252 0.034 7.454 
e7 Govt. Eff. 0.035 0.013 2.707 0.027 0.012 2.267 
φ Governance  Liberalism 0.912 0.026 34.812 0.903 0.026 34.241 
 Model Chi-Sq (df) 39.323 (12) 41.558 (13) 
 SRMR 0.019 0.021 
 CFI 0.973 0.972 
 BIC -20.643 -23.406 
 
 
 
 
